

Human Rights for Sale? A Study on the Uyghur Issue and Chinese Concessional Aid

Joseph Yinusa

Faculty Mentor: Dr. Scott Kastner

Motivations

- Background on Uyghur internment
- The PRC’s economic prowess
- “Dangling carrots in countries’ faces”
- Joint statements criticizing/defending the PRC’s actions
- Case studies
 - Qatar
 - Turkey

Question and Theory

- **Theory:** Higher receipt of concessional aid yields a higher likelihood for support for the donor country
- **Question:** Is there a correlation between the amount of concessional aid a country receives and their proclivity to defend the PRC government regarding the current Uyghur reeducation issue?

Hypotheses

- As countries receive more concessional aid from the PRC, the more likely they are to defend China’s internment of the Uyghur population in their Xinjiang province.
- As the percentage of Chinese concessional aid over GDP increases, countries are more likely to defend China’s internment of the Uyghur population in their Xinjiang province.

Schools of Thought

- Confusion regarding aid
 - Concessional vs. Investment
- Concessional aid and the “One-China” Policy
- Share of GDP predicts influence
- Flaws with existing research
 - Emphasis on UNGA voting coincidence
 - Focus on trade rather than aid

Methodology

- IV
 - Sum of raw concessional aid
 - Share of concessional over GDP (2014)
 - Share of concessional over GDP (Most Recent)
- DV
 - Signing onto Letter B (Defensive)
- Creation of original dataset consisting of:
 - William & Mary *Global Chinese Official Finance* dataset
- GDP (World Bank)
- Regime types (CIA)
- Target period: 2004-2014, N = 174
- Linear Probability Model, OLS regressions
- Controls for regime type
 - (Excluded) Democracies
 - Semi-Democracies
 - Authoritarian
 - In-Transition

Conclusions

- Failure to reject the null hypothesis
- Relationship significant until regime type is controlled for
- Criticism of the PRC appears more predictable
- Regime alignment is a potentially better predictor for solidarity
- Limitations of this project
 - Model does not account for Letter B defectors
 - Focus on concessional aid
 - Lack of variation for Letter A
 - Lack of potential markers for “support”
 - Possible reverse-causation and endogeneity
- Future research needed on:
 - Regime-influenced solidarity
 - Better markers for “influence”
 - The Uyghur issue itself


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
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my Faculty Mentor Dr. Kastner, the Research Assistantship program Teaching Assistant Alauna Safarpour, and the RA program coordinator Rachel Vierling for their sublime support during the duration of this research process.

Letter A (Critical) Signatories



Letter B (Defensive) Signatories



Results

Results (Letter B), All Countries			
	Dependent variable:		
	(1)	'Letter B (Defensive)'	(3)
Concessional Aid	0.009*** (0.003)		
Share of GDP up to 2014 (%)		0.006** (0.003)	
Share of GDP up to Most Recent Year (%)			0.007** (0.003)
Constant	0.087* (0.052)	0.266*** (0.047)	0.278*** (0.047)
Observations	174	169	173
R2	0.041	0.025	0.028
Adjusted R2	0.035	0.019	0.023
Residual Std. Error	0.395	0.389	0.394
F Statistic	7.282**	4.323**	4.981**
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

Results (Letter B), All Countries, Controlling for Regime Type			
	Dependent variable:		
	(1)	'Letter B (Defensive)'	(3)
Concessional Aid	0.004 (0.004)		
Share of GDP up to 2014 (%)		0.002 (0.003)	
Share of GDP up to Most Recent Year (%)			0.002 (0.003)
Non-Democracies	0.255*** (0.062)	0.242*** (0.061)	0.257*** (0.061)
Constant	0.017 (0.052)	0.083 (0.065)	0.086 (0.064)
Observations	174	169	173
R2	0.127	0.109	0.120
Adjusted R2	0.116	0.098	0.109
Residual Std. Error	0.378	0.373	0.376
F Statistic	12.400***	10.120***	11.570***
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			